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Vanishing hands? On the link between
product and organization architecture
Kerstin Press* and Markus M. Geipel**
The present article investigates whether modular product architectures deliver
better and more differentiated products, given their production in disintegrated
and integrated settings. A theoretic model benchmarks the performance of disin-
tegration and integration for different degrees of product modularity by measur-
ing both product quality and differentiation. In line with conventional wisdom,
(nearly) modular products befit disintegration insofar as disintegration increases
quality. However, disintegration only leads to greater product differentiation than
integration if there is substantial entry and exit. These findings—albeit developed
with stylised models of disintegration and integration—provide a possible explan-
ation for empirical results showing a decrease in product variety when modular
products were produced by independent manufacturers (disintegration).
Moreover, the model results predict that industries with limited entry and exit
as well as strong winner-take-all dynamics tend to incur a loss in variety if modular
products are produced in a disintegrated setting.
1. Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Coase (1937), the determinants of the boundaries of the
firm have been a central issue in economics. While different motivations for (dis-)
integration are discussed (Williamson, 1991; Langlois, 1988, 1992b; Mahoney, 1992;
Dosi et al., 2007 among many others), an important factor in the choice of firms or
markets lies with the nature of products. It is sometimes even argued that “although
organizations ostensibly design products, it can also be argued that products design
organizations, because the coordination tasks implicit in specific product designs
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largely determine the feasible organization designs” (Sanchez and Mahoney,
1996: 64).
This link of product and organization architecture has received renewed attention
with the emergence of modularity. Originating with engineering science, modularity
denotes a principle for splitting a product into sub-products that are connected via
standardized interfaces. It aims at obtaining (nearly) independent sub-products
(Langlois, 2002). Once the architecture and interfaces are established, sub-products
can be developed and modified independently, which is argued to lead to greater
product differentiation (mix and match, Prencipe et al., 2003), more robust produc-
tion processes (Langlois, 2002; Simon, 2002) and faster innovation (Langlois and
Robertson, 1992; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Sturgeon,
2002).
While a number of contributions discuss the benefits and downsides of modular
product architectures (Robertson and Langlois, 1995; Baldwin and Clark, 1997;
Christensen et al., 2002; Langlois, 2002; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004), their emergence
(Langlois, 1992a, 2002) as well as their current and expected future prominence
(Langlois and Robertson, 1989; Langlois, 2003, 2004, 2006), the interplay of product
modularity and firm boundaries is more blurred. While the (near) decomposability
of products achieved through modularity is argued to foster the emergence of inde-
pendent producers and thereby greater disintegration (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996;
Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001; Christensen et al.,
2002),1 others maintain that modular products require some firms acting as “systems
integrators” for coordinating sub-product manufacturers and to enable innovation
in the product architecture itself (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; Langlois, 2002;
Sturgeon, 2002; Dosi et al., 2007).
Empirically, both structures have been observed. Industries have shifted from
disintegrated to more integrated settings and back throughout their evolution
(Christensen et al., 2002). In some instances, a shift towards more integrated
modes of organization was caused in response to competitive pressures rather
than changes in the product’s architecture (e.g., in several Italian industrial districts,
Guerrieri et al., 2001; Paniccia, 2002; Cainelli and Zoboli, 2004). Another interesting
observation put forth by Christensen et al. (2002) and to some extent Deakin et al.
(2009) is that in some industries, modularity and disintegration were found to
reduce product differentiation. The issue that remains open in these investigations
is whether it is modularity causing this or its combination with disintegration. Put
differently, how does (dis)integration in the organizational architecture affect the
benefits to modularity?
1This is in line with related findings in organization studies, where (nearly) modular production
processes benefit firms with very independent departments (Frenken et al., 1999; Marengo et al.,
2000; Simon, 2002; Dosi et al., 2003).
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While the benefits of modularity for product variety through mix-and-match are
best achieved in disintegrated settings with very flexible producer relations, overall
product quality may well require some degree of integration to ensure coordination
between sub-product manufacturers. With more stable producer relations, less
mixing and matching may occur at the expense of overall product variety. The
question investigated here is the effect of coordination versus mix-and-match
achieved in integrated and disintegrated settings for overall product quality and
diversity. To study this aspect, Sections 2 and 3 develop a model analyzing the
relative efficiency of (dis)integrated structures in manufacturing products with dif-
ferent degrees of modularity. Both settings are archetypal and developed to empha-
zise the benefits of coordination versus mix-and-match. In contrast to most of
the literature, we measure efficiency through product quality and variety, thereby
also investigating under which conditions disintegration and the associated
mix-and-match dynamics lead to greater product differentiation.
As a result, we obtain a model where the stylized dynamics of coordination or
mix-and-match yield better performance depending on product architecture. This
enables us to give a more precise answer about when modularity befits (dis)integra-
tion. Moreover, we are able to investigate, in how far the benefits for product quality
and variety suggested in the literature are delivered. The model confirms existing
arguments (Section 4) insofar as modularity is required for disintegration and mix-
and-match dynamics to achieve better quality. For very interdependent product
architectures, quality is instead improved by integration and coordination.
However, modular products manufactured in the disintegrated setting are only
more varied, if there is entry and exit. Without entry and exit, the coordination
provided by more integrated organizational structures provides greater variety for
both low and high levels of modularity.
2. The model
We start by modelling a product through its production process. Both are treated as
interchangeable in the following. It is argued that any particular part in the product
has its equivalent in the production process, i.e., each of the N activities in the
production process contributes to one particular feature in the final product.
While this is a simplification of actual production processes, some level of modu-
larity in both product and production process is required to allow for disintegration
at the organizational level. Without both aspects, producers of product component
would not be able to operate independently and could not offer distinguishable
sub-products. Therefore, the following arguments about the structure of the pro-
duction process are equivalent to the architecture of the final product.
Each of the N production activities (xn) can be conducted in a specific way rep-
resented by its state an. For simplicity, activities can only take states 0 or 1 here. The
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full set of production activities Y¼ x1x2. . .xn then corresponds to the entire produc-
tion process and thereby the final product (Figure 1). Depending on the activity
states chosen, the production process and thus the product has a specific configur-
ation of 0 and 1 labeled C¼ a1, a2. . .an.
The success of conducting an activity in a particular way (an¼ 0 or 1) can differ,
i.e., each activity state has a “fitness value” (wn) associated with it. Moreover, pro-
duction activities can be interdependent, i.e., the fitness of one activity (wi) hinges on
the choice made for the state of another (aj). This is illustrated by the arrows in
Figure 1. Fitness values are assigned through a random draw from a uniform distri-
bution between 0 and 1 as in the N/K model (Kauffman, 1993). Higher wn denote
higher fitness values of the corresponding state an. In case of interdependent activ-
ities, one wn is drawn for each possible combination of activity states.
From the states and fitness values of all activities, one can derive the fitness of the
current configuration of the production process. It is equal to the average of the
fitness values of all production activities and represents product quality:
W ðY Þ ¼ 1
N
XN
n¼1
wnðan;Y Þ: ð1Þ
The product’s architecture is implemented as follows: the production process is split
into subsets of activities (modules) that give rise to different sub-products. For ex-
ample, in automobiles, activities in one module produce the engine while others
provide chassis, brakes, or tires. We represent this by partitioning production into
I equally sized modules Y¼X1X2. . .XI. Each module then gives rise to one
sub-product (Figure 2).
The partition is implemented such that each production activity is on one module
only, i.e., there is no overlap between modules as far as production activities are
concerned. However, splitting the production process can generate interdependen-
cies between sub-products, which are labeled external dependencies. In Figure 2, for
example, splitting Y into X1X3 leads to two internal dependencies [between activ-
ities (1, 3) in X1 and (9, 7) in X3]. Two other dependencies [between activities (2, 5)
and (5, 3)] are now external insofar as they connect modules X1 and X2.
The share of these external dependencies () proxies the degree of
non-modularity by defining to what extent sub-products depend on each other.
With ¼ 0, modules are fully independent, corresponding to a modular production
process with no external dependencies. For the process in Figure 2, we find two
Figure 1 A product represented by N¼ 9 production activities.
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internal, two external, and four dependencies in total. The share of external depen-
dencies would be ¼ 0.5 (50%), making this process lean towards the non-modular
end of the spectrum.2
Similar to overall product quality, sub-product quality W(Xi, Y) is equivalent to
the average of the fitness values of all activities in that sub-product.
W ðXi;Y Þ ¼ I
N
XiNI
n¼ði1ÞN
I
þ1
wnðan;Y Þ: ð2Þ
Due to the possibility of having external dependencies, W(Xi|Y) reads as the quality
of Xi in the context of a product with overall configuration Y. The context is essential
for the value of Xi. Since wn is drawn for every possible combination of interdepend-
ent activities, knowing the fitness value associated with a state an in sub-product
configuration Xi, requires knowledge of the states of any ai that an is interdependent
with. To obtain the quality of sub-product X2 in Figure 3, we have to set it in the
context of a final product Y in order to know the states of interrelated activities in
other sub-products.
To include several products and producers into the model of an industry, we
assume that there are J final products, leading to J I sub-products. Each
Figure 2 The product from Figure 1 is split into I¼ 3 modules. Now, we can differentiate
between internal {(x1, x3), (x9, x7)} and external {(x5, x2), (x5, x3)} dependencies.
Figure 3 To assess the quality of sub-product X2, we need a context Y¼ (X1, X3) as there is an
external dependency (x2 to x5) influencing the fitness of X2.
2The degree of non-modularity () is an independent variable in our model. Unlike some other
studies using the N/K framework (Marengo et al., 2000; Dosi et al., 2003; Ethiraj and Levinthal,
2004; Marengo and Dosi, 2005), we do not investigate what the best decomposition of the process is
or whether rationally bounded firms can “find” it. Moreover, thanks to our model setup, we can
directly influence  making it independent from the exact partition of the production process.
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sub-product is manufactured by one agent. Figure 4 depicts a setting, where I¼ J¼ 3.
Xi,j then denotes the activities of the j-th agent manufacturing sub-product i. In the
figure, X1,3 refers to the activities of the third agent manufacturing the first
sub-product (at the bottom of the first column).
The question of the relative advantage of (dis)integration comes into play when
looking at different ways of organizing production at the industry level. On the one
hand, one could imagine that each product is made in a firm-like setting (integra-
tion). In this case, sub-products are manufactured by departments and final product
assembly is fixed (Figure 5A). On the other hand, sub-products could be made by
different producers that interact in a market-like setting to assemble the final product
(disintegration). In this case, each producer develops her sub-product independently
and then combines it with complementary sub-products from other manufacturers
(Figure 5B).
In the following, we ask how the benefits of (dis)integration relate to the degree of
product (non)modularity (). The answer will depend on (i) the relative advantage
of fixed or flexible product assembly and (ii) the behavior of manufacturers and firm
departments. Both are described in more detail in the following section.
3. Model dynamics: industry organization and efficiency
To evaluate the relative performance of (dis)integrated settings for different product
architectures, we use product quality (proxied by fitness) and differentiation
(proxied by the differences in product configurations). Both measures highlight to
what extent the benefits ascribed to modularity (better and more differentiated
products) are delivered by the (dis)integrated setting.
In contrast to many existing papers using the N/K framework, quality (¼fitness) is
relative in our analysis. We are not concerned with whether agents do or can develop
Figure 4 An industry with J agents each producing one of the I sub-products. Columns are
groups of sub-product manufacturers, while lines correspond to one final product.
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the best possible product (the globally optimal configuration). Instead, we focus on
whether they can find better qualities for their products than other agents in the
industry. As a result, the relative performance of (dis)integration matters rather than
whether either setting would (theoretically) be able to develop the best possible
product.
3.1 Search
To start the model, agents (departments in the integrated and manufacturers in the
disintegrated setup) are endowed with an initial configuration of activities for their
sub-product. All agents then search for a better configuration of these activities, i.e.
one that delivers better quality. This search is implemented as a one bit mutation of
the agent’s activities. The tentative configuration ~X
ðtþ1Þ
i;j thus differs in one activity
state from the previous one X
ðtÞ
i;j . Moving from 010 to 011 would be an example.
Search activity takes place in each simulation step and is conducted in parallel by all
agents.3
Search activity is identical, implying that departments and independent manufac-
turers have the same capabilities for developing their sub-product. While this may be
a heavy simplification of real life, the focus of the present analysis is on the relative
advantage of (dis)integration. Endowing agents with different search capabilities
would introduce another parameter that is not of direct relevance to the question
addressed here. In addition, it is difficult to justify an advantage of firm departments
A
B
Figure 5 Organizing production. (A) In the integrated case, sub-product combinations are
fixed. (B) In the disintegrated case, different sub-product combinations are possible.
3Search parameters (e.g., the number of activity states changed or the number of activities per
agents) are key to performance in the N/K framework (Kauffman, 1993; Auerswald et al., 2000;
Kauffman et al., 2000; Press, 2006). As search is identical in both setups, this does not interfere with
our results. We tested this notion by implementing different search mechanisms (see Section 4.1),
which did not modify the qualitative nature of the results.
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or independent manufacturers in sub-product development: the latter enjoy a spe-
cialization benefit since they focus on a subset of the production process (Marshall,
1920; Paniccia, 2002), whereas the former enjoy many scale and scope effects (e.g.,
regarding resource availability). As a result, we are aware of the importance of agent
search ability but leave this concern for later analysis. The difference between (dis)in-
tegration then arises from the adoption of new sub-product configurations (due to
different behavioural incentives) as well as in the assembly of the final product. Both
are elaborated in the following sections.
3.2 Disintegration
The disintegrated setup has the advantage that final products are assembled flexibly.
A “good” manufacturer of one sub-product can therefore search for “good” manu-
facturers of complementary sub-products. However, this freedom means greater
uncertainty about the partners with whom one will assemble a final product. The
future configurations of other sub-products are thus unknown, implying that manu-
facturers wanting to adopt a sub-product configuration have to make assumptions
about the configurations of other sub-products, which may turn out to be incorrect
(Axelrod and Cohen, 1999). Both aspects are reflected in adoption and assembly
dynamics.
Through search, all manufacturers arrive at a tentative sub-product configuration
~X
ðtþ1Þ
i;j . Adoption then determines, whether the tentative configuration is chosen over
the current one. As agents are autonomous, they make opportunistic decisions: they
select the alternative that optimizes the quality of their sub-product. If the tentative
configuration is better than the previous one, it will be adopted. Otherwise, manu-
facturers stick with their existing sub-product.
As there may be external dependencies, manufacturers need a context to assess
sub-product quality (see Section 2). In the present setting, we assume that relation-
ships among manufacturers are extremely flexible in order to maximize the
mix-and-match dynamics associated with modularity and disintegration. This
implies that assembly of the final product takes place through spot transactions
among manufacturers. As a consequence, manufacturers do not know ex ante,
which complementary sub-products they can acquire. In addition, higher product
quality is assumed to be rewarded by consumers. All manufacturers would therefore
like to be part of the best product currently known in the industry.4
If manufacturers seek to be part of the best known product in the industry (Y*),
they should develop sub-products suited for it. Unfortunately, due to the extreme
mix-and-match dynamics, manufacturers do not know what the configuration of the
relatively best product will be in tþ 1. Therefore, the current best product Y*(t)
4Again, the “best” product refers to the configuration with the currently highest fitness value and
not to the overall optimal product (which may well be beyond agent’s reach).
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becomes the common benchmark, meaning that each manufacturer evaluates her old
and new sub-product configuration as if they were to be integrated in the relatively
best product at time t. In doing so, the manufacturer obtains an expected quality for
her tentative configuration W ð ~X ðtþ1Þi;j ;Y ðtÞÞ as well as for the old one W ðX ðtÞi;j ;Y ðtÞ).
She adopts the new configuration, if it provides a higher expected quality:
X
ðtþ1Þ
i;j ¼
~X
ðtþ1Þ
i;j ; ifW ð ~X ðtþ1Þi;j ;Y ðtÞÞ > W ðX ðtÞi;j ;Y ðtÞÞ
X
ðtÞ
i;j ; otherwise:
(
ð3Þ
For product architectures with high modularity, this mechanism ensures relatively
accurate manufacturer decisions: since there are few or no external dependencies,
expected product quality will be relatively close to actual product quality. With lower
modularity (higher ) the errors in assessing sub-product configuration become
more extreme, thereby decreasing the accuracy of manufacturer decision-making.
Given the adoption of sub-product configurations, final product assembly is
complicated by the flexibility in relationships between manufacturers. We assume
that a “market-like mechanism” matches sub-product manufacturers. Its logic is
straightforward: agents take the expected quality of their adopted configuration
W ðX ðtþ1Þi;j ;Y ðtÞ) to signal to others. Manufacturers with high expected qualities
make attractive assembly partners able to choose other high quality manufacturers
(and vice versa). As a result, we rank agents according to their expected quality. All
manufacturers with the best, second-best, third, etc. expected qualities get matched
to assemble a final product (Figure 6).
An alternative approach to assembly lies in a sequential implementation of the
market-like mechanism. This would find producers of modules one and two signal-
ing their expected quality to each other with manufacturers being matched based on
their ranking. In a second step, the matched configurations of modules one and two
are re-assessed regarding their expected quality and then ranked again to be matched
with producers of module three. Our findings revealed that this does not alter the
Figure 6 Product assembly in the disintegrated case: all firms are ranked (1–3) by their
expected sub-product quality. Firms with the same rank contribute to one final product.
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relative performance of the (dis)integrated setting. Opportunities for “bad” matches
still exist in the early stages of the value chain, which implies that the greater certainty
of more downstream fitness values does not offset the higher quality of
decision-making in the integrated setting.
3.3 Integration
The integrated setup lacks the freedom of flexible assembly found in the disintegrated
case. This implies that a department manufacturing a “good” sub-product may be
held back by departments with inferior performance in the same organization. At the
same time, department decisions are not based on assumptions about the activities of
others as a control instance enables coordination. These aspects map out as follows.
The modelling of the integrated setup is based on Siggelkow and Rivkin (2005). As
was explained earlier (Section 3.1), each department generates a tentative alternative
~X
ðtþ1Þ
i;j to its current configuration via search activity. It presents the current and
tentative configuration to a coordinator, which could be the CEO. The coordinator
then has to choose while being subject to limited cognitive power. Thus, not all
possible combinations of old and new sub-product configurations are tried out.
Instead, the coordinator randomly combines old and new sub-products into a ten-
tative configuration of the final product ~Y
ðtþ1Þ
j .
5 This configuration is tested against
the status quo (Y
ðtÞ
j ) and the one with the higher quality is adopted:
Y
ðtþ1Þ
j ¼
~Y
ðtþ1Þ
j if W ð ~Y ðtþ1Þj Þ > W ðY ðtÞj Þ
Y ðtÞ; otherwise
(
ð4Þ
Based on the coordinator’s decision, departments put together the sub-product con-
figurations ( ~X
ðtþ1Þ
i;j or X
ðtÞ
i;j ) to form the final product (Y
tþ1
j ). This fixed assembly is
illustrated in Figure 7.
While the thus assembled final product is certain to have a higher quality than the
previous one, the integrated setup will tend to be slower in improving its products as
improvements have to be obtained for the entire production process rather than for
one sub-product. Moreover, fixed assembly can lead to lock-in with a specific con-
figuration if the number of elements required to be changed for greater quality
exceeds the search range of all departments taken together. As a result, the integrated
setting will tend to be slower than the disintegrated one in improving product
quality and may well lock-in with sub-optimal product configurations. At the
same time, its lack of speed and flexibility may well be compensated for through a
greater certainty about product quality, especially when the level of modularity is low
(high ).
5Old (X
ðtÞ
i;j ) and new (
~X
ðtþ1Þ
i;j ) sub-products enter with equal probability P¼ 0.5.
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4. Results: modularity and (dis)integration
In the disintegrated and integrated setting, search, adoption, and assembly lead to J
final products with configurations Y
ðtÞ
j in each simulation step. Based on these con-
figurations, product quality and differentiation are measured at the industry level to
assess the relative performance of (dis)integration. In this section, we discuss the
simulation setup and results. We start by explaining the independent and dependent
variables (Section 4.1). Next, we present the results of the baseline case (Section 4.2)
and then add entry and exit to the model (Section 4.3).
4.1 Parameter settings
The model was implemented6 as follows. We use the degree of non-modularity ()
and the type of industry organization [(dis)integrated] as independent variables. We
simulate a production process with N¼ 64 activities split into I¼ 8 sub-products of
unit size n¼ 8. Each sub-product is manufactured by J¼ 10 agents, bringing the total
number of agents to 80. Regarding interdependence, we used an average of K¼ 4
dependencies per activity. The share of external dependencies encompasses fully
modular (¼ 0.00) and non-modular processes (¼ 0.50) with intermediate
stages set in steps of ¼ 0.1.7 We changed this setup to include simulations with
different numbers of agents (J¼ 5) or dependencies (K¼ 2 and K¼ 8), as well as
varying sizes of the production process (N¼ 32) and its modules (I¼ 4). Moreover,
we implemented simulations with other search mechanisms. While one-bit mutation
constituted the baseline, we also included “probabilistic search”, where each activity
Figure 7 Product assembly in the integrated case: firm departments (rows) contribute to one
final product.
6The model was implemented in Java. To obtain N/K fitness landscapes, a random number gen-
erator (Java Version 1.5.0) was used. Over 120 different setups were simulated 500 times to generate
significant results.
7An -value of 0.25 thus means that one-quarter of all dependencies in the production process span
sub-products. With an average of K¼ 4 dependencies per activity, each activity would then be
linked (on average) to one activity outside its sub-product and to three activities within the same
sub-product.
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in the sub-product could be changed with varying likelihood (P). The relative per-
formance of the (dis)integrated setup (Sections 4.2 and 4.3) was not sensitive to these
changes as the decisive factors for relative performance are selection and assembly
dynamics (with search being identical in both settings—see Section 3.1—it shifts
overall results but not relative performance). All results are based on 500 simulation
runs for each -value.
To know which form of industry organization is better for a certain degree of
modularity, we measure average product quality in the industry ( W ).
W ¼ 1
J
XJ
j¼1
W ðYjÞ: ð5Þ
Furthermore, we measure product diversity, i.e., diversity in product configurations.
To evaluate this, we measure the difference between products by calculating the
aggregate Hamming distance of their production processes. This assumes that dif-
ferently configured production processes lead to products with different character-
istics. To arrive at this measure, we start by calculating the mutual Hamming
distances. For two processes A¼ a1. . .aN and B¼ b1. . .bN, it is defined as:8
HðA;BÞ ¼
XN
x¼1
1 if ½ax 6¼ bx 
0 otherwise

ð6Þ
To measure total diversity, we use the aggregate Hamming distance H , i.e., the
average of the mutual Hamming distances between all products. The higher H ,
the higher diversity.
H ¼ 1
J 2
XJ
m¼1
XJ
n¼1
HðYm;YnÞ: ð7Þ
4.2 Industry organization and efficiency
The relative performance of the (dis)integrated setup is determined by the degree of
(non-) modularity. When plotting average quality in two sample runs (Figure 8a and
b), the disintegrated setting outperforms the integrated one only if the product is
relatively modular (here ¼ 0.1). However, repeating the simulations 500 times
shows that on average (Figure 8c and d), the integrated setting delivers higher quality
in the long run, regardless of the level of modularity. While the more speedy opti-
mization in the disintegrated setting delivers an initial quality advantage for relatively
modular products (low ), with time the benefits to coordination start to overwhelm
those of mix-and-match (Figure 8c).
8The Hamming distance gives the number of production activities with different states. For
instance, if A¼ 110 and B¼ 101, then H(A, B)¼ 2 as the states of x2 and x3 differ.
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The long-term advantage of the integrated setting stems from two aspects. First,
product architectures that are not fully modular convey a benefit to coordinated
decision-making as it accounts for all external dependencies. As mentioned earlier
(Section 3.3), coordination reduces the speed to quality improvements, thereby con-
veying a speed benefit to the disintegrated setting. The effect of integration is thus
akin to the results described by Marengo et al. (2000) as coordinated
decision-making eliminates the errors caused by a lack of accounting for external
dependencies in the disintegrated setting. However, this rationale cannot explain why
the long-term performance of the integrated setting exceeds that of the disintegrated
one in fully modular product architectures. The reason for this finding is instead tied
to the results on product diversity.
0 200 400 600 800
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
fit
ne
ss
time
0 200 400 600 800
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
fit
ne
ss
time
time
a
lp
ha
200 400 600 800
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
alpha
fit
ne
ss
(a) (c)
(b) (d)
Figure 8 Product quality in the disintegrated and integrated setting over time and for
different values of . Figure (a) shows the evolution of quality in a sample run with ¼ 0.1.
The disintegrated case (dashed) delivers higher quality. Figure (b) contains a sample run with
¼ 0.3 where the integrated case (solid) performs better in quality. Figure (c) highlights quality
at each simulation step averaged over 500 runs. Grey areas correspond to higher average quality
in the disintegrated case, which is most prominent in early simulation stages and for low 
values. White areas denote higher average quality in the integrated setting, which concentrates
on later simulation stages and higher  values. Figure (d) compares average quality values at the
last simulation step with the integrated setting (solid) delivering better average quality.
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When considering product diversity, the integrated setting delivers greater variety,
especially for relatively modular products (Figure 9a versus b). As can be obtained
from Figure 9c, the integrated case generally delivers greater diversity. The only
exception to this are settings with fully or highly modular products where in the
long run, diversity increases in the disintegrated setting. This finding is opposed to
conventional wisdom, where modularity and disintegration are argued to be accom-
panied by greater product variety. Instead, the disintegrated setup shows a sharp
decrease in diversity for low levels of  (Figure 9d).
The push towards more homogeneous products in the disintegrated setting is
caused by the adoption mechanism. All manufacturers strive to be part of the best
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Figure 9 Product diversity in the disintegrated and integrated setting over time and for
different values of . Figure (a) shows the evolution of diversity in a sample run with
¼ 0.1. The integrated case (solid) delivers higher diversity. Figure (b) contains a sample
run with ¼ 0.3 where both settings deliver similar diversity levels. Figure (c) highlights
diversity at each simulation step averaged over 500 runs. Grey areas correspond to higher
average diversity in the disintegrated case, which only occurs at late stages of simulations with
low  values. White areas denote higher average diversity in the integrated setting, which
corresponds to early simulation stages and higher  values. Figure (d) compares average
diversity at the last simulation step with the integrated setting (solid) delivering higher average
diversity if 40.
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currently known product (see Section 3.2). For low levels of , the activities of one
manufacturer have only limited effects on others, resulting in low mutual disturbance.
Therefore, agents would settle with one sub-product configuration relatively soon and
optimization dynamics cease. This effect is also responsible for the lower long-term
quality as compared to the integrated case, where optimization is less prone to lock-in.
Since the evaluation of these sub-product configurations is done in the same
context, each group of sub-product manufacturers would come up with similar
configurations, thereby reducing product variety and increasing the likelihood of
lock-in. In situations with higher , this effect no longer holds, as the greater
mutual disturbance between agents produces more and more changes in sub-product
configuration. This effect reduces the tendency of having homogeneous configur-
ations in each group of manufacturers and thereby increases diversity of final prod-
ucts. In the fully or very highly modular case (¼ 0.00), diversity ends up being
higher since agents are free to choose any sub-product configuration—the config-
urations of other sub-products are irrelevant for their quality. As a result, different
configurations may be optimal (due to internal dependencies), thereby giving rise to
greater product diversity.
Summing up, the present model confirms the discussion in the existing literature
insofar as modularity allows for disintegration and disintegration delivers more
speedy improvements of product quality. However, we do not find support for the
notion of greater variety in product characteristics if (nearly) modular products are
manufactured in the disintegrated setting. While this finding is related to the nature
of the matching process in the disintegrated case, it does propose a rationale for the
observation of less product diversity in modular industries. If producer relations are
extremely flexible and all strive to be part of the best currently known product,
modularity and disintegration may increase product homogeneity. However, these
results are set in a situation where bad producers stay active in the industry. Section
4.3 therefore benchmarks them against those of a model with selection.
4.3 The role of entry and exit
The previous findings are based on a model where low-quality producers stay active
in the industry. This could distort the results on relative performance with respect to
quality. To account for this aspect, we included entry and exit to the model by
implementing a selection mechanism. Selection is modeled as least fit removal mean-
ing that the agent with the lowest product quality is taken out. The removal takes
place in equidistant time intervals (every 20 simulation steps). The removed agent is
replaced with a perfect copy of the top performing one. This mimics a dynamics
where industry entrants imitate the top performer or where the best performing
companies expand production capacities.
We are aware that the assumption of perfect imitation is a strong one [especially
against the research of Rivkin (2000) or Nelson and Winter (1982)]. Reducing the
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goodness of imitation reduced the effect of selection but did not alter the qualitative
nature of the results presented here. This is due to the fact that the important
dynamics for quality and differentiation reside in product assembly rather than
imitation itself. In the disintegrated setting, the new entrant corresponds to several
sub-product manufacturers that may well be matched with other agents in the fol-
lowing simulation steps. In the integrated setting, the new entrant corresponds to a
new organization that will seek to improve upon the whole production process in
subsequent steps. As a result, the effect of entry and exit for the industry differs.
In the integrated setting, entry and exit increase average quality up to a point as
copies of the currently best organization are being introduced. This is illustrated by
the gradual yet steady increase of product quality (Figure 10a and b). However, entry
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Figure 10 Product quality in the disintegrated and integrated setting over time and for
different values of  including entry and exit. Figure (a) shows the evolution of quality in
a sample run with ¼ 0.1. The disintegrated case (dashed) initially delivers higher quality.
Figure (b) contains a sample run with ¼ 0.3 where the integrated case (solid) performs
better in terms of quality. Figure (c) highlights quality at each simulation step averaged over
500 runs. Grey areas correspond to higher average quality in the disintegrated case, which is
concentrated with lower  values. White areas denote higher average quality in the integrated
setting, which relates to higher  values. Figure (d) compares average quality values at the last
simulation step with the integrated setting (solid) delivering better average quality if 40.1.
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and exit decrease product variety for the very same reason: copies of the currently
best organization are introduced (Figure 11a and b). Especially with time, improve-
ment on these configurations becomes more difficult implying that all firms even-
tually lock-in with the same configuration (Figure 10d). In contrast to the previous
setting where optimization started and proceeded from very different product con-
figurations, entry and exit homogenize the starting-point for optimization in the
integrated case, thus implying that organizations finally lock-in the same configur-
ation. As this effect starts to materialize in early stages of optimization, it inhibits the
integrated setting from developing more differentiated products in case of (nearly)
modular production processes. Put differently, the long-term performance advantage
of coordinated decision-making is eliminated for (nearly) modular products. This is
also illustrated in the phase diagram (Figure 10c), where the disintegrated setting
always delivers higher diversity in the long run.
The effect of selection on diversity in the integrated setting is stronger for less
modular products (high ), i.e., diversity decreases more quickly. This is due to the
fact that more modular products (low ) have fewer external dependencies, i.e.,
individual departments are more likely to find improvements to the benefit of the
entire firm. In these cases, there will be more changes in configuration over time than
in less modular ones. Therefore, selection may work to copy different current best
organizations over time. While diversity always goes to zero in the long run, more
modular product architectures have less stability in their current top product imply-
ing that homogeneity takes longer to be established.
In the disintegrated setting, selection introduces a copy of the currently best
manufacturers, which may however be matched to different sub-products in the
following simulation steps. This effect works to increase overall product quality.
When selection occurs at time t, there is at least one product with configuration
Y*(t) in tþ 1, namely the newly introduced copy. This increases the quality of
decisionmaking of agents with configurations suited to the last “best” product of
the industry [which usually correspond to those producers that were part of Y*(t) at
time t as they have no or fewer modifications to perform in order to obtain a suitable
sub-product configuration]. This effect gives optimization a (short-lived yet re-
peated) boost that is also evidenced by the pronounced quality “jumps” in the
sample runs (Figure 10a and b).
Overall, selection works to increase product quality (albeit through different
mechanisms) in the disintegrated and the integrated case (compare panel (d) in
Figures 8 and 10). Moreover, selection decreases variety for both settings (compare
panel (d) in Figures 9 and 11). However, product variety now becomes relatively
higher for the disintegrated case (Figure 11a and b), which is more in-line with the
theoretic predictions on the joint effect of modularity and disintegration. This shift
in relative performance is due to the fact that diversity converges to zero in the
integrated setting while surviving at a lower level in the disintegrated one thanks
to the aforementioned mix-and-match dynamics. This implies that long-term
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diversity is always higher in the disintegrated case (Figure 11c). The only time when
mix-and-match does not work to produce greater variety for the disintegrated setting
are fully modular product architectures (¼ 0.0). Here, the homogenizing effect of
adoption decisions sets in (Section 4.2), bringing variety to zero in the disintegrated
case. In the integrated case, variety survives as the independence of sub-product
quality implies that firm departments can encounter beneficial modifications for a
more extended time, thereby shifting the configuration of the leading firm that is
copied through selection. In this one case, variety seems to last longer in the inte-
grated case, although at the end, it also converges to zero (compare Figure 11 panel c
and d).
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Figure 11 Product diversity in the disintegrated and integrated setting over time and for
different values of  including entry and exit. Figure (a) shows the evolution of diversity in
a sample run with ¼ 0.1. The disintegrated case (dashed) delivers greater diversity in the long
run. Figure (b) contains a sample run with ¼ 0.3 where the disintegrated case (dashed)
performs better overall. Figure (c) highlights diversity at each simulation step averaged over
500 runs. Grey areas correspond to higher average diversity in the disintegrated case, occurring
for higher  values and in later simulation stages. White areas denote higher average diversity
in the integrated setting, occurring in early simulation stages and for very low  values. Figure
(d) compares average diversity at the last simulation step with the disintegrated setting
(dashed) delivering higher diversity if 40.
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In sum, selection increases quality and reduces diversity for the integrated and the
disintegrated setting. However, the aforementioned dynamics imply that with selec-
tion, the joint benefits of modularity and disintegration materialize as predicted in
the literature, provided that product architectures are nearly modular. The benefits
to modularity and disintegration that are emphasized in the literature thus depend
on the extent of entry and exit in the industry. If both are strong, they materialize
more strongly than in cases with little or no selection.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we studied the link between product modularity, (dis)integration and
the benefits to product quality and variety proposed in the literature. We started by
developing a model able to assess, for which degrees of modularity in products and
production, (dis)integration produces better quality and more differentiated prod-
ucts. In line with existing work (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark,
1997; Langlois, 2002), a minimum degree of modularity is required for obtaining a
higher quality with a disintegrated organization of production. For non-modular
products, integration of production within a firm achieves better qualities. Beyond
this, the article showed that the benefits to modularity and disintegration (namely
greater product quality and in particular variety) are conditional on the existence of
entry and exit. In absence of both, integration delivers more differentiated products.
As a result, we can conclude that (nearly) modular products favor disintegration but
that greater product differentiation is then conditional on entry and exit.
While the model mechanisms of modifying and assembling products constitute a
heavy simplification to real-world production processes, there may be some indus-
tries exhibiting similar dynamics. For instance, industries with strong on the spot
“winner takes all” dynamics (e.g., creative industries like advertising where compe-
tition for projects is strong). Such industries could—in a disintegrated setting—
exhibit the effect of everyone wanting to be part of the currently best project in
the industry as described by the model. In case of very flexible producer relations,
such industries may witness a decrease in product differentiation provided that there
is limited entry and exit. More stable producer relations or leading companies acting
as systems integrators would work to offset these effects and thereby contribute to
obtaining the benefits to modularity. In this vein, the stratification of the disc-drive
industry described by Christensen et al. (2002) could—alongside the more techno-
logical reasons given in the paper—also have contributed to the resulting loss of
product variety.
While more extensive empirical analysis would be required to determine the role
of industry-specific aspects in generating these findings, we argue that the link be-
tween product modularity and (dis)integration is more nuanced than often
acknowledged.
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